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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the warrantless frisk of defendant based on an 
articulable reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and 
dangerous or that he had committed or was committing a crime? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No. 20560 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of the charged crime, in 
a non-jury trial held August 29, 1984, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. Judge Wilkin-
son sentenced defendant on February 15, 1985, to an indeter-
minate prison term of 1 to 15 years and a $10,000 fine. 
The Judge stayed execution of the prison term and the fine 
and placed defendant on probation in the intensive super-
vision program for 18 months. The court also imposed a 
fine of $1,000 and a 90-day jail term which defendant 
elected to serve by participating in 450 hours of community 
service. As a further condition of probation, defendant was 
required to maintain full employment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The brief detention of defendant for purposes of 
a limited frisk for weapons was justified by the officer's 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a concealed 
weapon, which is a crime. The facts as known to the officer, 
viewed from an objective standard, supported the officer's 
suspicion of defendant's criminal activity and the officer's 
desire to protect himself from defendant's possible use of 
a concealed weapon. The trial court, therefore, properly 
denied defendant's motion to suppress the pistol that the 
officer discovered during the pat-down search. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 21, 1984 at approximately 9:00 a.m., 
Officers Mitchell and Baird of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office responded in separate patrol cars to a suspicious vehic 
complaint (T. 66-67, 105-106). The name of the complainant 
given to them by dispatch was Orlando Roybal (T. 68, 106). 
The address given was 3387 South 145 East (T. 67, 74). 
The complainant said the vehicle was a green sedan carrying 
three male Mexicans (T. 106). 
Both officers had received information earlier that 
morning from their car partners that Orlando Roybal, the 
defendant, had been arrested at approximately 5:30 a.m. that 
day (T. 68, 107). The car partners said defendant was arreste 
at that time for a domestic disturbance at the same address 
(T. 68, 113). Defendant's girlfriend had called in the police 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
when defendant allegedly shot holes through a window of 
their apartment with a firearm (T. 68-69, 113). The car 
partners reported that the firearm was not recovered when 
defendant was taken into custody (T. 68, 114). 
Mitchell and Baird began talking over their car 
radios immediately and exchanged the information their car 
partners had related to them earlier (T. 108-110). Mitchell 
asked dispatch if defendant remained in jail at that time and 
was told that he was in jail (T. 70, 107). Mitchell then 
asked dispatch for the complainant's location and was given 
the address of a telephone booth near the Grand Central store 
on 3400 South and State Street, two blocks west of defendant's 
apartment (T. 70-71, 106). Mitchell asked dispatch to call 
the telephone number and to send a deputy to the telephone 
booth (T. 73). When the deputy arrived at the booth, the 
phone was ringing and there was no one there (T. 73). 
Mitchell and Baird continued on to the apartment 
complex arriving at the same time (T. 75). They saw no green 
sedan and no one on foot in the area (T. 75, 115). They parked 
their cars on opposite corners of the west side of the complex 
and waited a few minutes (T. 75, 115). After a short time, 
a male Mexican emerged from between two buildings, hesitated 
for a moment, looked up and down the street, and walked across 
the lawn toward Mitchellfs car (T. 76-77, 115, 117-118). 
Mitchell stepped out of his marked patrol car but 
stood behind the car door as the man, identified at trial as 
-3-
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defendant, approached the driver's side of Mitchell's car 
(T. 76-77, 83-84)- When he arrived at the driver's side of 
Mitchell's car, defendant turned so that he was not facing 
Mitchell but his side was toward Mitchell and leaned back 
against the car in front of the open door as if he was 
concealing his back from Mitchell (T. 78). 
Mitchell had never seen defendant before that time 
and did not know that he was Orlando Roybal (T. 82) nor did 
Baird (T. 120) . Mitchell stated that he asked defendant when 
he got out of jail but that he did not know why he asked him 
that (T. 78, 103). He said defendant did not identify himself 
but defendant testified that he did identify himself as Orlando 
Roybal as he walked toward Mitchell (T. 85, 138). 
As defendant leaned against Mitchell's car, Baird 
approached them (T. 79, 119). Mitchell was concerned for his 
safety because of the nature of the call and the nature of 
the offense the previous night (T. 81). Mitchell, therefore, 
began a pat-down search of defendant by grasping defendant's 
arm with one hand and running his other hand around defendant's 
belt line (T. 79). Rolled into defendant's underwear waistband 
at the small of his back, Mitchell found a loaded pistol 
(T. 100-101) . 
Mitchell said at trial that defendant made no 
movements that indicated he was armed (T. 81-84). Rather, 
Mitchell said the situation as a whole appeared suspicious 
to him including the nature of the previous call, the fact 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that defendant was supposedly still in jail at the time the 
suspicious vehicle complaint was made by a person using his 
name, and the way defendant leaned against the car with his 
side toward Mitchell which forced him to turn his head to 
talk with Mitchell (T. 89-90, 100). 
Defendant testified elaborately about the events 
leading up to his arrest both on the previous call and the 
call which resulted in the possession of a dangerous weapon 
charge. He insisted that he did nothing to cause the officers 
to suspect that he was armed (T. 138-139) and claimed that he 
borrowed the pistol on the morning of his arrest to protect 
himself from a group of persons who were after him (T. 136, 
155) . 
Judge Wilkinson admitted the pistol which was seized 
from defendant after considering defendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence (T.38). Thereafter, Judge Wilkinson found 
defendant guilty of possessing a firearm while being a 
restricted person (T. 178). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS FRISK OF DEFENDANT 
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE 
AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT 
OF THE FRISK WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
AT TRIAL. 
There are three separate levels of police encounters 
with the public. They are: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
-5-
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as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an "arti-
culable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 498-499 (1983) . 
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984). 
The encounter between Officer Mitchell and defendant fit all 
three levels of contact described in Merritt. First, Mitchell 
merely spoke with defendant without detaining him as defendant 
voluntarily approached Mitchell. Second, after defendant leaned 
against the patrol car, Mitchell became suspicious of defend-
ant's behavior and detained defendant by grasping his arm while 
performing a limited weapons search. Third, Mitchell arrested 
defendant after discovering the pistol concealed in defendant's 
waistband. 
Defendant challenged only the second level of contact 
in the trial court, and on this appeal, claiming that Mitchell 
did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity to justify the detention and frisk of defendant. 
He does not challenge the arrest as lacking in probable cause. 
To justify the detention of defendant, Mitchell must 
have had "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, 
that the individual [was] involved in criminal activity." 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985); quoting 
-6-
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Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The reasonableness 
of the frisk of defendant for weapons must also be judged by 
an objective standard; i.e., "would the facts available to 
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief1 that the 
action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21-22 (1968); see also State v. Carter, No. 19522, slip op. 
at 3 (Utah filed Sept. 27, 1985). 
In this case, the facts that justify the detention 
are the same facts that justify the search. Officer Mitchell 
knew the following: (1) defendant was arrested in the early 
morning hours of the same day for a domestic disturbance 
during which a firearm was discharged (T. 68, 113); (2) NO 
firearm was recovered at that time (T. 68, 114); (3) the 
caller making the suspicious vehicle complaint identified 
himself as Orlando Roybal, defendant's name (T. 68, 106); 
(4) dispatch said that defendant was in jail at the time 
the officers were responding to the complaint; (5) the 
location of the suspicious vehicle was defendant's address 
(T. 68, 74, 113); but (6) the location of the caller making 
the complaint was a telephone booth two blocks from defend-
ant's home (T. 71, 106); (7) there was no one at the tele-
phone booth when officers checked it (T. 73); (8) there was 
no green sedan or persons on foot around the apartment complex 
fitting the description of the suspicious vehicle or persons 
(T. 75, 115); defendant approached Mitchell's patrol car 
-7-
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voluntarly after a brief hesitation and identified himself 
as Orlando Roybal (T. 118, 138); when defendant reached the 
driver's door of Mitchell's car, he stopped, turned sideways 
to Mitchell, and leaned his back against the front of the 
car as if to conceal his back from Mitchell and Baird who 
was at that time approaching the scene (T. 77-78, 120). 
On these facts, Mitchell had reason to suspect that defendant 
was committing the crime of carrying a concealed weapon and 
that he might be about to commit a crime by using that weapon 
against Mitchell and Baird. Because there was no suspicious 
vehicle in the area and no other persons around, Mitchell was 
justified in thinking that defendant's complaint was a ruse, 
intended to create the opportunity for revenge against the 
officers who had arrested him hours earlier for domestic 
violence involving discharge of a firearm. Because the 
firearm was not recovered in the previous arrest, Mitchell 
reasonably suspected that defendant still had access to it. 
Although Mitchell testified that he was not afraid 
of defendant, there is: 
no legal requirement that a policeman 
must feel "scared" by the threat of 
danger. Evidence that the officer was 
aware of sufficient specific facts as 
would suggest he was in danger satisfies 
the constitutional requirement . . . so 
long as it is clear that he was aware 
of specific facts which would warrant 
a reasonable person to believe he was 
in danger. 
United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976). 
On the facts known to Mitchell at the time, regardless of 
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whether they were in fact ultimately erroneous as defendant 
claims, any reasonable person in the same position would 
have believed he was in danger and, therefore, the detention 
and frisk were justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests this Court to uphold the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress, to deny defendant's 
request for a new trial, and to affirm defendant's conviction, 
DATED this day of October, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R. 
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